Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis

James Albrecht () and Jan van Ours ()

No 399, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract: This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

Keywords: Recruitment; signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-ltv
Date: Written
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp399.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behaviour to Test the Educational Signalling Hypothesis (2001)
Working Paper: Using employer hiring behavior to test the educational signaling hypothesis (2001)
Journal Article: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp399

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Address: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Mark Fallak ().