Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects

Boris Hirsch (), Thorsten Schank () and Claus Schnabel ()
Additional contact information
Boris Hirsch: University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

No 4126, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract: Using a large linked employer-employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for men and workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to non-employment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than one year. Our results indicate that works councils primarily represent the interests of a specific clientele.

Keywords: works council; separations; collective voice; duration models; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J53 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-lab
Date: Written
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://ftp.iza.org/dp4126.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects (2009)
Working Paper: Work councils and separations: voice, monopoly, and insurance effects (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4126

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Address: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Mark Fallak ().