Are Intellectual Property Rights Unfair?

Gilles Saint-Paul ()

No 639, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract: If redistribution is distortionary, and if the income of skilled workers is due to knowledgeintensive activities and depends positively on intellectual property, a social planner which cares about income distribution may in principle want to use a reduction in Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) rather than redistributive transfers. On the one hand, such a reduction reduces statis inefficiency. On the other hand, standard redistribution also reduces the level of R and D because it distorts occupational choice. We study this possibility in the context of a model with horizontal innovation, where the government, in addition to taxes and transfers, controls the fraction of innovations that are granted patents. The model predicts that standard redistribution always dominates limitations to IPRs.

Keywords: intellectual property rights; innovation; income distribution; inequality; redistribution; welfare state; human capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D3 H23 I3 J24 J31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pbe
Date: 2002-11

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Related works:
Working Paper: Are Intellectual Property Rights Unfair? (2003)
Working Paper: Are Intellectual Property Rights Unfair? (2002)
Journal Article: Are intellectual property rights unfair? (2004)
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