Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better?

Eric Albert Strobl () and Frank Walsh

No 661, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract: Efficiency wage theory predicts that the wage per unit of effort will be lower in intensively monitored sectors. This wage differential will increase in effort. Using employer-employee matched data from Ghana we provide evidence supporting this hypothesis.

Keywords: efficiency wages; monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
Date: 2002-12
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