Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

James Albrecht (), Pieter Gautier () and Susan Vroman ()

No 719, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Abstract: We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.

Keywords: job search; directed search; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J64 D83 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
Date: 2003-02
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Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications (2004)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Application
Journal Article: Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications (2006)
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