Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism

Maria Vittoria Levati () and Ro'i Zultan ()

No 2009-029, Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek

Abstract: This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Our approach avoids most drawbacks of the traditional procedures because it relies on endogenous cycle lengths, which are defined by the number of contributors a player waits before committing to a further contribution. Based on hypothetical distributions of randomly generated contribution sequences, we provide strong evidence for conditionally cooperative behavior. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time.

Keywords: Public goods game; Real-time protocol; Information feedback; Conditional cooperation; Simulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pbe
Date: 2009-04-20

Downloads: (external link)
http://zs.thulb.uni-jena.de/receive/jportal_jparticle_00148047 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-029

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek
Series data maintained by Markus Pasche ().