Explaining de facto judicial independence

No 46/03, Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Kassel, Institute of Economics

Abstract: Judicial Independence (JI) as factually implemented varies considerably between countries. Since de iure JI is an imperfect predictor of de facto JI, a number of variables that might determine the factual level of judicial independence is theoretically discussed and empirically tested. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the short run and those that are the result of historical development and are exempt from short-term modification is made. Ascertaining the relative relevance of these two groups of variables promises to be policy-relevant because attempts to make judiciaries more independent within governance programs might be seriously constrained by factors beyond the control of national governments and international organizations.

Keywords: Judicial independence; informal institutions; formal institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2003
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Forthcoming in International Review of Law and Economics

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Related works:
Working Paper: Explaining de facto judicial independence (2003)
Working Paper: Explaining de facto Judicial Independence (2005)
Working Paper: Explaining de facto judicial independence (2003)
Journal Article: Explaining de facto judicial independence (2007)
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