Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

Stefan Voigt (), Michael Wilhelm Ebeling () and Lorenz Blume ()
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Lorenz Blume: Department of Economics, University of Kassel

No 67/04, Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Kassel, Institute of Economics

Abstract: It is argued that government credibility is an important resource and that it can be improved by delegating decision-making competence beyond the nation-state. It is hypothesized that such delegation should result in higher income and growth. Some former British colonies retained the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as their final court of appeals even after independence. This court is thus taken as a natural experiment to test our hypothesis. It turns out that retaining the jurisdiction is indeed significant for explaining economic growth.

Keywords: Credibility; Delegation of Competence; Judicial Independence; Economic History; Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K11 K41 N40 O57 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: Written 2004-12
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Published in Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 82 (2007), Issue 2, pp. 348-373.

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Journal Article: Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence--the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (2007)
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