Cost Padding in Regulated Monopolies

Spiros Bougheas and Tim Worrall ()
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Spiros Bougheas: Department of Economics, Nottingham University

No 2001/07, Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) from Department of Economics, Keele University

Abstract: In this paper we consider a regulated monopoly that can pad its costs to increase its cost reimbursement. Even while padding is ineácient the optimal incentive scheme tolerates some padding of costs to reduce the information rents paid to low cost types. It is shown that high cost firms pad costs more than low cost ßrms. We also show that cost padding moves pricing away from Ramsay optimal pricing toward more monopolistic pricing rules. We show that when auditing of total costs is costly, low cost firms face a fixed price contract and engage in no cost padding. High cost ßrms do less well but do engage in padding to increase the verified cost. If padded costs can be audited at some cost, low cost types engage in cost padding but high cost types do not. We also endogenize the distribution of cost types by allowing firms to engage in a pre-contractual, non-observable or verißable cost-reducing investment. The firm adopts a mixed strategy and this determines the distribution of cost types at the contracting stage. An example is given to show how the equilibrium distribution is computed.

Keywords: Regulation; cost padding; costly state falsißcation; costly state verification; endogenous screening. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 L2 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-03, Revised 2001-11
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