Abstract:
This paper examines a dynamic model of mutual insurance when households can also engage in self-insurance by storage. This mutual insurance is informal as it is assumed that there is no enforcement mechanism, so any mutual insurance arrangements must be self-enforcing. It is shown how consumption allocations satisfy a modified Euler condition and that an enhanced storage technology can either raise or diminish welfare. Furthermore it is shown that the ex ante transfers introduced into dynamic informal insurance models recently by Gauthier, Poitevin, and Gonz´alez (1997) are only used here in the first period, with the role of ex ante transfers being replaced by differential individual storage.
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from Department of Economics, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire ST5 5BG - United Kingdom http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/pubs_kerps.htm
More papers in Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) from Department of Economics, Keele University Address: Department of Economics, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG - United Kingdom Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Martin E. Diedrich ().
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