Double Bertrand Competition among Intermediaries

Frederique Bracoud ()

No KERP 2003/09, Keele Economics Research Papers from Centre for Economic Research, Keele University

Abstract: This paper extends Stahl (1988) by modelling a sequential price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers’s default. If this revenue is non-monotonie with the asking price, theWalrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing may emerge instead.

Keywords: Bertrand Competition; Double-sided Competition; Consumer Default; Demand Rationing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D45 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12
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