Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: a Generalized Bidding Approach

Yuan Ju () and David Wettstein ()
Additional contact information
David Wettstein: Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Postal: Beer-Sheva, 84105, Israel.

No KERP 2006/06, Keele Economics Research Papers from Centre for Economic Research, Keele University

Abstract: This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games.We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus and equal surplus values are implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as power shifts away from the proposer to the rest of the players. Moreover, an alternative informational structure where these solution concepts can be implemented without imposing any conditions of the transferable utility game is discussed as well.

Keywords: Implementation; bidding mechanism; Shapley value; consensus value; equal surplus value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
Date: Written 2006-04
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Working Paper: Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach (2006)
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