On Moral Hazard and Joint R&DSimona Fabrizi () and Steffen Lippert () No KERP 2007/03, Keele Economics Research Papers from Centre for Economic Research, Keele University Abstract: This paper analyzes how the determinants of two entrepreneurs’ choice whether to conduct product innovation R&D projects alone, or in a cross license agreement, or in a research joint venture depend on the intrinsic nature of the R&D projects. Results show that in fundamental research -- which is considered to be affected by moral hazard behavior of the researchers -- there is a systematic bias toward conducting R&D projects alone and against making use of synergies in an RJV. Furthermore, from a social standpoint, in non-fundamental research -- which is considered not to be affected by moral hazard behavior of the researchers -- too few RJVs and too few cross license agreements are chosen; whereas in fundamental research too few RJVs, and too many cross license agreements are chosen. Keywords: Monetary policy; zone of discretion; intermediate inflation target. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Keele Economics Research Papers from Centre for Economic Research, Keele University |
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