Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

Tibor Neugebauer, Javier Perote (), Ulrich Schmidt and Malte Loos

Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy

Abstract: In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of information feedback and an elicitation of individual beliefs about others’ contributions. Altogether, our data support the hypothesis of conditional cooperation with a selfish bias.

Keywords: experimental economics; information feedback; public goods; voluntary contributions; conditional cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pbe
Date: 2007-09
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Related works:
Working Paper: Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments (2005)
Journal Article: Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kie:kieliw:1376

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