Wage subsidies and international trade: When does policy coordination pay?

Sebastian Braun () and Christian Spielmann ()

Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy

Abstract: National labour market institutions interact across national boundaries when product markets are global. Labour market policies can thus entail spill-overs, a fact widely ignored in the academic literature. This paper studies the effects of wage subsidies in an international duopoly model with unionised labour markets. We document both positive and negative spill-over effects and discuss the benefits and costs from international policy coordination both for the case of symmetric and asymmetric labour market institutions. Our results suggest that institutional differences could sign responsible for the slow speed at which labour market policy coordination has progressed so far

Keywords: Wage subsidies; policy spill-overs; international policy coordination; unionised labour markets; trade; asymmetric labour market institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F16 F42 J38 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
Date: 2010-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/wa ... ion-pay/kwp-1599.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Wage subsidies and international trade: When does policy coordination pay? (2012)
Working Paper: Wage subsidies and international trade: When does policy coordination pay? (2012)
Working Paper: Wage subsidies and international trade: When does policy coordination pay? (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kie:kieliw:1599

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Dieter Stribny ().