Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions

Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten

No 7, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: Experimental sealed-bid first-price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given. The concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium, which is based on a principle of ex post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison, captures the data.

Keywords: Auctions; Overbidding; Feedback; Experiments; Ex-post rationality; Bounded rationality; Social comparison (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2004-04-08
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Forthcoming Games and Economic Behavior

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http://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/RePEc/download/wp0007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions (2002)
Journal Article: Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kls:series:0007

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