Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information

Gary Bolton, Ben Greiner () and Axel Ockenfels

No 42, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: Reciprocal feedback distorts the production and content of reputation information, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Data from eBay and other sources combined with laboratory data provide a robust picture of how reciprocity can be guided by changes in the way feedback information flows through the system, leading to more accurate reputation information, more trust and more efficient trade.

Keywords: market design; reputation; trust; reciprocity; eBay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C9 D02 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
Date: 2009-02-24

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http://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/RePEc/download/wp0042.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kls:series:0042

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