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Autonomy of the University and the Professionalisation of its Organisation of Control

Oliver Fabel () and Dominique Demougin ()

No 05-05, Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor from Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim

Abstract: Professionalizing the system of control in a still public system implies that the university administration becomes an agent of the academic board of the university rather than serving the interests of the state as the principal. This induced organizational change alters the bargaining positions of the ministery and the university which both aim to maximize their rent share in the budget negotiations. In particular, bargaining with powerful universities then only concerns a fixed transfer. Moreover, academic effort may decrease and there will be unproductive activities. As a result the ministery may feel pressed to restrain the bargaining power of the university by law that reduces the degree of university autonomy in strategic and organizational decision making.

Keywords: Organizational Autonomy; Organization of Control System; Principal Agent Approach; Bargaining Model instruments; robust interference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M21 M40 L30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-05-10

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