On (Non-) Monotonicity of Cooperative Solutions

Yair Tauman and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Additional contact information
Yair Tauman: Tel Aviv University and Stony Brook University

No 13, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics

Abstract: Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.

Keywords: Cooperative games; aggregate monotonicity; axiomatic solution; core; Shapley value; nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2009-01, Revised 2009-10
Note: Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.kse.org.ua/RePEc/pdf/KSE_dp13.pdf Revised version, October 2009 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kse:dpaper:13

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Andriy Zapechelnyuk ().