Optimal Fees in Internet Auctions

Alexander Matros and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
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Alexander Matros: University of Pittsburgh

No 3, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics

Abstract: An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.

Keywords: Internet auctions; auctions with resale; auction house; listing fee; closing fee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ict and nep-mkt
Date: 2008-01
Note: Published in Review of Economic Design, 12, 155-163 (2008)
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http://www.kse.org.ua/RePEc/pdf/KSE_dp3.pdf Revised version, January 2008 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Optimal fees in internet auctions (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kse:dpaper:3

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