The law of unintended consequences in soccer: impact of three-point-a-win rule on strategies and outcomes
Oleksandr Shepotylo ()
No 30, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics
This paper analyzes whether the three-point rule in soccer brought more action to the game for a large sample of European championships in 1990-1997, revealing team-specic heterogeneity of responses caused by differences in team tactics in the period prior to the rule change. Teams that relied more heavily on tie-intensive tactics dramatically changed their behavior towards more attacking style in away games, considerably reducing probability of a tie. Interestingly, even though the three-point rule signicantly reduced proportion of ties, it did not bring more goals into the game because the increased rewards of scoring when the current score is tied were oset by increased incentives of defending the current score when one team led.
Keywords: heterogeneous response; soccer; sports; three-point system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C40 L51 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
Note: Submitted to Journal of Sports Economics
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.kse.org.ua/pdf/KSE_dp30.pdf June 2010 (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kse:dpaper:30
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Iryna Sobetska ().