Domain L-Majorization and Equilibrium Existence in Discontinuous Games
No 31, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics
We study the equilibrium existence problem in normal form and qualitative games in which it is possible to associate with each nonequilibrium point an open neighborhood and a collection of deviation strategies such that, at any nonequilibrium point of the neighborhood, a player can increase her payoff by switching to the deviation strategy designated for her. An equilibrium existence theorem for compact, quasiconcave games with two players is established. We propose a new form of the better-reply security condition, called the strong single deviation property, that covers games whose set of Nash equilibria is not necessarily closed. We introduce domain L-majorized correspondences and use them to study equilibrium existence in qualitative games.
Keywords: Majorized correspondence; Qualitative game; Discontinuous game; Better-reply security; Single deviation property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2010-07, Revised 2011-05
Note: Revised and resubmitted to Economic Theory
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http://repec.kse.org.ua/pdf/KSE_dp31.pdf Revised version, May 2011 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kse:dpaper:31
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