The Dutta-Ray Solution on the Class of Convex Games: A Generalization and Monotonicity Properties

Jens Leth Hougaard (), Bezalel Peleg () and Lars Peter Østerdal
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Lars Peter Østerdal: Institute of Public Health, University of Copenhagen

No 03-29, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers generalized Lorenz-maximal solutions in the core of a convex TU-game and demonsrtates that such solutions satisfy coalitional monotonicity and population monotonicity.

Keywords: convex games; core solutions; generalized Lorenz-maxima; coalitional monotonicity; population monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2003-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: THE DUTTA-RAY SOLUTION ON THE CLASS OF CONVEX GAMES: A GENERALIZATION AND MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0329

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