Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity

Aurélie Bonein () and Daniel Serra

Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier

Abstract: This paper highlights a new social motivation, the indirect reciprocity, through a three-player dictator-ultimatum game. Player 2 has the opportunity to reward or punish indirectly the player 1 by inciting – with her offer - player 3 to accept or to reject the division. We implement three treatments: in the first two we vary player 2’s available information whereas in treatment 3, players take part in a dictator game - as proposers - before being player 2s in the dictatorultimatum game. Results show that 55% of subjects in treatment 2 and 28% in treatment 3 behave as indirect reciprocity predicts. Another reciprocal behavior - the generalized reciprocity - is investigated through a three-player dictator game. Our data show that 80% of players 2 act according to this reciprocal behavior. Finally, our findings confirm that the more complex the strategic interaction becomes the more self-regarding behavior is likely and the less otherregarding behaviors, such as reciprocity, dominate.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-soc
Date: 2007-04, Revised 2007-04

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http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Fr/Productions/Documents/DR2007-04.pdf First version, 2007 (application/pdf)
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Working Paper: Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:07-04

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