What Drives the Arrangement Timetable of Bank Loan Syndication ?

Christophe J. Godlewski ()

Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) from Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université de Strasbourg (France)

Abstract: We investigate the influence of loan and syndicate characteristics and information disclosure and legal environment factors on the arrangement timetable of bank loan syndications (measured as the time elapsed from the launching until the completion of the deal) from 68 countries over the 1992-2006 period. Employing accelerated failure time models from survival analysis methodology, we find that loan, syndicate, legal environment and information disclosure characteristics which reduce agency problems related to syndication reduce the arrangement timetable. Among the country level characteristics, information disclosure which reduces moral hazard due to informational frictions between syndicate members appears to be the most important driver of a faster deal arrangement timetable, while better creditor rights protection increase the arrangement timetable, consistently with recontracting risk issues.

Keywords: Syndicated loans arrangement timetable; Agency problems; Information disclosure; Legal risk; Survival analysis; Accelerated failure time models. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 C41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cta and nep-reg
Date: 2008
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://ifs.u-strasbg.fr/large/publications/2008/2008-02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lar:wpaper:2008-02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) from Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université de Strasbourg (France)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christophe J. Godlewski ().