Collateral and Adverse Selection in Transition Countries

Laurent Weill () and Christophe J. Godlewski ()

Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) from Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université de Strasbourg (France)

Abstract: This paper tackles the question of knowing whether collateral helps solve adverse selection problems in transition countries. We use a unique dataset of about 400 bank loans from 16 transition countries. Our findings support the view of a positive link between the presence of collateral and the risk premium, which is in accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis. This suggests that collateral does not mitigate adverse selection problems in transition countries.

Keywords: Bank; collateral; transition economies. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 P20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tra
Date: 2008
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://ifs.u-strasbg.fr/large/publications/2008/2008-10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Collateral and Adverse Selection in Transition Countries (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lar:wpaper:2008-10

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) from Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université de Strasbourg (France)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christophe J. Godlewski ().