Die Übernahme von Denner durch Migros verstösst gegen das Kartellgesetz

von Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas and Mario Jametti ()

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP

Abstract: We investigate whether it is likely that the Swiss competition authority (WEKO) will approve the acquisition of Denner (the number 3 retailer in Switzerland) by Migros (the number 1 retailer). We argue that the decisions made by the European competition authorities are helpful guidelines in this case. We find it likely that the merger will not be approved. Both concentration and barriers to entry in the Swiss retail market are already very high. The takeover of the "third force" by the market leader would eliminate effective competition, both from the perspective of clients and suppliers. It is conceivable that the WEKO might not be willing to fully apply the law, and merely ask Migros to sell a port of Denner's retail network to a foreign competitor.

Keywords: merger, retail; market concentration; barriers to entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L41 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
Date: 2007-04

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:07.02

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