Fair ultimatum: an experimental study of the Myerson value

Noemí Navarro and Róbert Ferenc Veszteg ()

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP

Abstract: We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the empirical behavior of the bid-and-propose mechanism, defined in Navarro and Perea (2005). This mechanism implements the Myerson value for networks, and therefore its outcome posesses fairness properties. Since the bid-and-propose mechanism includes an ultimatum game in the last stage, we design an experiment with several treatments, where subjects also play the simple ultimatum game. In order to check whether subjectsbehave fairly in the sense of Myerson or they are inequity averse, we compare resultsfrom games with symmetric and asymmetric outside options.

Keywords: experiments; fairness; Myerson value; ultimatum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
Date: 2007-08
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:07.05

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