Central Bank Independence and Inflation: The case of Greece

Theodore Panagiotidis () and Afrodit Triampella

Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics, Loughborough University

Abstract: This paper investigates the argument for Central Bank Independence (CBI) in the case of Greece. Using a time series approach and the last data available before Greece joined the EMU, the hypothesis that central bank independence is important for controlling inflation is examined. Employing two indices, which serve as proxies for CBI, LegalCBI and TOR, the inverse relationship between CBI and inflation was confirmed. The interactions between the variability of inflation and CBI were also investigated. Furthermore, evidence was found to suggest that the rate of turnover Granger causes inflation.

Keywords: Central Bank Independence; Inflation; Greece. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-fmk, nep-mac and nep-mon
Date: 2005-07, Revised 2005-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Central Bank Independence and inflation: the case of Greece (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2005_7

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