Double Auction Equilibrium and Efficiency in a Classroom Experimental Search Market
Giuseppe Attanasi (),
Samuele Centorrino and
Ivan Moscati ()
No 11.03.337, LERNA Working Papers from LERNA, University of Toulouse
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