Selection Wages and Discrimination

Ekkehart Schlicht ()

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Applicants for any given job are more or less suited to fill it, and the firm will select the best among them. Increasing the wage offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard and improve the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off between the wage level and the productivity of the workforce are known as selection wages. As men react more strongly to wage differentials than females, the trade-off is more pronounced for men and a profit-maximizing firm will offer a higher wage for men than for women in equilibrium.

Keywords: Discrimination; selection wages; efficiency wages; hiring standards; monopsony; employment criteria; wage posting; Reder competition; social roles; social stereotypes; social multiplier; statistical discrimination; taste discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J7 B54 D13 D42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
Date: 2009-09

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Related works:
Working Paper: Selection wages and discrimination (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:10990

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