The Optimal Number of Charities

Philippe Barla () and Pierre Pestieau ()

Cahiers de recherche from Université Laval - Département d'économique

Abstract: In this paper charity brings some joy of giving; it yields more contributions to public goods than standard "subscription", but its creation is costly. We compare the laissez-faire number of charities with both the second and the first-best level. In general, laissez-faire implies an underprovision of both charities and public goods.

Keywords: Charities; Public Good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L31 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
Date: 2005

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Optimal Number of Charities (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:laeccr:0501

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