Sharing and Anti-Sharing in Teams

Prof. Dr. Roland Kirstein and Robert D. Cooter

No 7001, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: Compared to budget-balanced Sharing contracts, Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. If a team members becomes Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. Anti-Sharing is more likely to yield a higher team profit than Sharing, the larger the team, the curvature of the production function, or the marginal effort cost. Sharing is more likely to be better, the greater the marginal product, the cross-partials of the production function, or the curvature of the effort cost.

Keywords: Budget-breaker; supermodularity; constrained efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 L23 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-mac
Date: 2007-01
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ww.uni-ma ... _Dateien/2007_01.pdf First version, 2007 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sharing and anti-sharing in teams (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Guido Henkel ().