Collusion or Sniping in simultaneous ascending Auctions

Sascha Füllbrunn ()

No 7025, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo (2002) derive collusive equilibria where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the Hard Close auction format, a prisoner’s dilemma situation results and collusive equilibria no longer exists, even for only two bidders. Hence, we introduce a further reason for sniping behavior in Hard Close auctions.

Keywords: collusion; sniping; multi unit auctions; prisoner’s dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
Date: 2007-11
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mag:wpaper:07025

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