Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

Ola Andersson, Matteo Maria Galizzi (), Tim Hoppe (), Sebastian Kranz (), Karen van der Wiel and Erik Wengström ()
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Tim Hoppe: Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

No 8020, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.

Keywords: Communication in Games; Cheap Talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: 2008-08
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http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2008_Dateien/2008_20.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mag:wpaper:08020

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