Picking the Winners

Pablo Amoros ()

No 2009-2, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: We analyze the problem of choosing the w contestants who will win a competition within a group of n>w competitors when all jurors commonly observe who are the w best contestants but may be biased. We study conditions on the configuration of the jury so that it is possible to induce the jurors to always choose the best contestants, whoever they are. If the equilibrium concept used by the jurors is dominant strategies, the necessary and sufficient conditions incorporate very strong informational requirements on the mechanism designer. If we relax the equilibrium concept to Nash or subgame perfect equilibria the necessary and sufficient conditions are less demanding. Moreover, these conditions are also necessary for any other equilibrium concept. Finally, we study one specific application: we propose a simple and natural mechanism for the case where each juror is biased in favor of one and only one (different) contestant.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Social choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
Date: 2009-06

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2009-2

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