THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION

Drew Fudenberg, David Levine () and Eric S. Maskin

Working papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics

Keywords: information; game theory; economic models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994)
Working Paper: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994)
Journal Article: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994)
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