Disorganization

Olivier Blanchard () and Michael Kremer ()

Working papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics

Abstract: Under central planning, many firms relied on a single supplier for many of their inputs. Transition has led to decentralizaed bargaining between suppliers and buyers. Under incomplete contracts or asymmetric information, such bargaining can be inefficient, and the mechanisms that mitigate this problem in the West an only play a limited role in transition.

Keywords: BUSINESS; ORGANIZATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: Disorganization (1997)
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