Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

Susan Athey ()

Working papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper derives sufficient conditions for a class of games of complete information , such as first price auctions, to have pure trategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). The paper treats games between two or more heterogeneous agents, each with private information about his own type (for example, a bidder's value for an object or a firm's marginal cost of production) , and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution which potentially allows for correlation between types.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; INFORMATION; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM; AUCTIONS; PRICING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C63 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written

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Related works:
Journal Article: Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information (2001)
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