Contract Design for Biodiversity Procurement

Peter Bardsley and Ingrid Burfurd

No 1031, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: Market based instruments are proving e¤ective in biodiversity procure- ment and in the management of regulatory schemes to preserve biodiversity. The design of these schemes brings together issues in auction design, con- tract theory, ecology, and monitoring. Using a mixed adverse selection, moral hazard procurement model, we show that optimal contract design may di¤er signi?cantly between procurement and regulatory policy environ- ments

Keywords: biodiversity; procurement; adverse selection; contract theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-env
Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Contract Design for Biodiversity Procurement (2009)
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