Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination – Large-Scale Experimental Evidence

Francesco Feri (), Bernd Irlenbusch () and Matthias Sutter ()
Additional contact information
Francesco Feri: Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck
Bernd Irlenbusch: London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

No 2009_14, Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present a series of coordination experiments with a total of 1,101 participants. We find that teams of three subjects each coordinate much more efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model.

JEL-codes: C71 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: 2009-04
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2009_14online.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence (2008)
Working Paper: Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination – Large-Scale Experimental Evidence (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_14

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Brigitte Martin ().