Unilateral Action and Negotiations about Climate Policy

Kai A. Konrad () and Marcel P. Thum ()

No unilateral_action_and_negotiations_about_climate_policy, Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.

Keywords: mitigation; international climate agreements; bargaining; unilateral advances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q54 Q58 F53 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ene and nep-env
Date: 2011-12
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Related works:
Working Paper: Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy (2011)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:unilateral_action_and_negotiations_about_climate_policy

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