The role of R&D technology in asymmetric research joint ventures

Sami Dakhlia (), Flavio Menezes () and Akram Temimi ()
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Akram Temimi: C&BA

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: We characterize asymmetric equilibria in two-stage process innovation games and show that they are prevalent in the different models of R&D technology considered in the literature. This leads to a reassessment of the potential benefits of research cooperative agreements. Indeed, cooperation in R&D may be accompanied by high concentration in the product market. We show that while such an increase may be profitable, it may be socially inefficient.

Keywords: Research and development; research joint ventures; process innovation games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L1 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino and nep-mic
Date: 2004-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Role of R&D Technology in Asymmetric Research Joint Ventures (2005)
Journal Article: THE ROLE OF R&D TECHNOLOGY IN ASYMMETRIC RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b04054

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