Relative Uncertainty and Additively Representable Set Rankings

Walter Bossert () and Arkadii SLINKO

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: This paper proposes a definition of relative uncertainty aversion for decision models under complete uncertainty. It is shown that, for a large class of decision rules characterized by a set of plausible axioms, the new criterion yields a complete ranking of those rules with respect to the relative degree of uncertainty aversion they represent. In addition, we address a combinatorial question that arises in this context, and we examine conditions for the additive representability of our rules.

Keywords: Choice under comete uncertainty; uncertainty aversion; additive reesentability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2004-13

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