Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies

Marc FLEURBAEY and Yves SPRUMONT

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e. agents cannot receive subsidies from others.

Keywords: social ordering; blic good; maximin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
Date: 2006
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