A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules

Walter Bossert () and Kotaro SUZUMURA

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference. The properties used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available.

Keywords: Collective Choice Rules; Consistency; Pareto Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: Written 2006
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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2149 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A characterization of consistent collective choice rules (2008)
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