Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity

Walter Bossert () and Kotaro SUZUMURA

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: Although the theory of greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizability under general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations is well-developed in the literature, these standard notions of rational choice are often considered to be too demanding. An alternative definition of rationality of choice is that of non-deteriorating choice, which requires that the chosen alternatives must be judged at least as good as a reference alternative. In game theory, this definition is well-known under the name of individual rationality when the reference alternative is construed to be the status quo. This alternative form of rationality of individual and social choice is characterized in this paper on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations.

Keywords: Reference-Dendent Choice; Individual Rationality; Efficiency; Coherence Prorties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-upt
Date: Written 2006
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