Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: We consider situations in which agents are notable to completely distinguish between all alternatives. Preferences respect individual objective indifferences if any two alternatives are indifferent whenever an agent cannot distinguish between them. We present necessary and sufficient conditions of such a domain of preferences under which majority rule is quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winner sexist for any set of alternatives. Finally, we compare our proposed restrictions with others in the literature, to conclude that they are independent of any previously discussed domain restriction.

Keywords: Quasi-Transitivity; Majority Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: Written 2007

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Related works:
Working Paper: Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule (2002)
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