Social Norms and Rationality of Choice

Walter Bossert () and Kotaro Suzumura

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a wide spread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties coping with the existence of external social norms. This paper introduces a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and shows that external social norms can be accommodated so as to be compatible with norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of rational choice on general domains à la Richter (1966;1971) and Hansson (1968)

JEL-codes: D11 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hpe, nep-soc and nep-upt
Date: 2007

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