Abstract:
This paper revisits manipulation via capacities in centralized two-sided matching markets. Sönmez (1997) showed that no stable mechanism is nonmanipulable via capacities. We show that non-manipulability via capacities can be equivalently described by two types of non-manipulation via capacities: non-Type-I-manipulability meaning that no college with vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its empty positions; and non-Type-II manipulability meaning that no college with no vacant positions can manipulate by dropping some of its filled positions. Our main result shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique stable mechanism which is non-Type-I-manipulable via capacities and independent of truncations. Our characterization supports the use of the student-optimal stable mechanism in these matching markets because of its limited manipulability via capacities by colleges.
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